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Abstract 
The public sphere has experienced yet another structural transformation. Firms like Facebook 
and Google have largely automated the types of decisions made by managers at television 
networks, or editors at newspapers – but with much more powerful effects. Long critiqued in 
academic circles, the manifest inadequacy of this new media landscape is now itself a matter of 
public debate. The deficiencies of the automated public sphere are so manifest that consumer 
protection and media regulatory authorities must intervene. As they do so, they should carefully 
examine how emergent dynamics of communicative capitalism vitiate older societal protections. 
New methods of monitoring and regulation should be as technologically sophisticated and 
comprehensive as the automated public sphere they target. 
 
This article first describes the documented, negative effects of online propagandists’ 
interventions (and platforms’ neglect) in both electoral politics and the broader public sphere 
(Part I). It then proposes several legal and educational tactics to mitigate platforms’ power, or to 
encourage or require them to exercise it responsibly (Part II). The penultimate section (Part III) 
offers a concession to those suspicious of governmental intervention in the public sphere: some 
regimes are already too authoritarian or unreliable to be trusted with extensive powers of 
regulation over media (whether old or new media), or intermediaries. However, the 
inadvisability of extensive media regulation in disordered societies only makes this agenda more 
urgent in well-ordered societies, lest predictable pathologies of the automated public sphere 
degrade their processes of democratic will formation. 
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Introduction 
As internet usage grew in the 2000s, scholars promoted its emancipatory potential. Yochai 
Benkler praised not only the wealth that would be promoted by networks, but also its distribution 
– toward a platform of platforms that would enable millions of new voices to be heard online 
(Benkler 2007). This optimism also animated one of the United States’s seminal cases on 
internet regulation, Reno v. ACLU (1997), which presumed the openness of the internet would 
redound to the benefit of all. The majority opinion in ACLU darkly cautioned the US government 
to avoid mucking about in many forms of internet regulation, lest it infringe on free expression 
rights in an online environment that the justices, as well as later boosters, idealised. Large 
platforms themselves harbour utopian pretensions to this day; for example, Mark Zuckerberg has 
marketed Facebook as a nascent global community (even as social critics lament how time online 
diverts citizens from in-person engagement with friends and neighbours) (Rushkoff 2016). 
 
Even in the 1990s, scholars warned about the implications of deregulating the internet (Chin 
1997). By the mid-2010s, it is hard to remain optimistic about the role of the internet in 
organising a new, and critically important, digital public sphere. Wealth has emerged in online 
advertising, but it is largely claimed by two firms – Google and Facebook take about 75% of the 
USD 73 billion digital advertising market in the US (Bond 2017). These information 
intermediaries are driven by profit, and their methods of selecting and arranging newsfeeds and 
search engine results pages are secret (Pasquale 2015b: 59-100). The promised Wealth of 
Networks has given way to a black box society – one where trolls, bots, and even foreign 
governments maraud to distort the information environment on Twitter, Facebook, Google 
News, Reddit, and other networks. 
 
We now know that virtually every positive promise made about the internet in the early 2000s, 
has a shadow side. While secrecy has empowered some voices who would otherwise be afraid to 
speak up, it has also protected trolls, doxers, and other bad actors online who silence others’ 
speech via intimidation. Moreover, online anonymity is of a piece with financial anonymity, 
which has empowered thousands of shell companies to obscure who is actually funding 
messages that could sway the public, legislators, and regulators. Everyone is invited to 
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participate, but so too is ‘everyone’ capable of disrupting other communities of interest online, 
via hashtag spamming or trolling – whether by civil society groups, state actors, or miscreants 
pursuing disruption ‘for the lulz.’ First celebrated as a way to hold states accountable for illegal 
actions, Wikileaks has emerged as a witting agent of authoritarian state interference in elections 
with a troubling tendency to emit anti-Semitic messages. Manipulation of algorithmically 
generated and organized content has disturbed many thoughtful observers of internet culture 
(Bridle, 2017). While major content owners have found their grip on public attention diminished, 
fragmentation of audiences has given megaplatforms unprecedented global power over attention-
commanding interfaces.  
 
That last reversal is the subject of this article. In a world of stable and dominant media firms, 
large social networks and search engines were in a rough equilibrium of power relative to the 
owners and creators of the content they selected and arranged (Pasquale 2010b). However, a 
general trend toward media revenue decline (and platform revenue growth) makes a new 
endgame apparent: online intermediaries as digital bottlenecks or choke-points, with ever more 
power over the type and quality of media that reaches audiences (Bracha and Pasquale 2008; 
Pasquale 2008b).1 The source of this power is, at bottom, Big Data – the ability of 
megaplatforms to accumulate ever-more-intimate profiles of users, which are then of enormous 
interest to commercial entities, political campaigns, governments – indeed, anyone aspiring to 
monitor, monetise, control, and predict human behaviour.   Megaplatforms readily deploy Big 
Data to dividualise and demobilise voters, rather than to unify and motivate them.2 Tailored 
manipulation disrupts already fragile processes of democratic will formation, undermining media 
pluralism and deliberative dialogue. 
 
Large online intermediaries tend to reduce at least one good type of media pluralism, and tend to 
promote a very destructive type of diversity.3 They make the metric of success online ‘virality,’ 
promoting material that has received a good deal of attention or seems to match a sub-public’s 
personalisation profile, regardless of whether it is true or even minimally decent (Pasquale 
2006). That reduces pluralism by elevating profit considerations over the democratising 
functions of public discourse, and effectively automating the public sphere. Decisions that once 
were made by humans with plural aims and aspirations are now made by profit-maximising 
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algorithms, all too prone to self-reinforcing logics of rapid, vapid, viral dissemination. Moreover, 
the same intermediaries also promote a very troubling diversity by permitting themselves to be 
manipulated by the most baseless and dangerous propagandists (Marwick and Lewi, 2017).4 
Such media is particularly capable of influencing low-information, floating voters – exactly the 
persons all too likely to swing the results of elections. 
 
This article first describes the documented, negative effects of online propagandists’ 
interventions (and platforms’ neglect) in both electoral politics and the broader public sphere 
(Part I). It then proposes several legal and educational tactics to mitigate platforms’ power, or to 
encourage or require them to exercise it responsibly (Part II). The penultimate section (Part III) 
offers a concession to those suspicious of governmental intervention in the public sphere: some 
regimes are already too authoritarian or unreliable to be trusted with extensive powers of 
regulation over media (whether old or new media), or intermediaries. However, the 
inadvisability of extensive media regulation in disordered societies only makes this agenda more 
urgent in well-ordered societies, lest predictable pathologies of the automated public sphere 
degrade their processes of democratic will formation. 
 
 
The Long Shadow of Intermediary Irresponsibility 
 
As Jürgen Habermas observed in 1962, ‘the process in which societal power is transformed into 
political power is as much in need of criticism and control as the legitimate exercise of political 
domination over society’ (Habermas 1962: 210). As part of the Frankfurt school, Habermas was 
sensitive to the ways in which new media, manipulated by both corporate and state actors, had 
fundamentally altered processes of democratic will formation. He deemed such transitions a 
‘structural transformation’ of the public sphere, since new forms of media both accelerated, 
altered, and reshaped the expression critical to opinion formation. 
 
The basic contours of mass media-driven politics and culture evolved through much of the 
second half of the twentieth century. Since the mid-1990s, change has accelerated here, as it has 
in much of contemporary society (Rosa 2015). Megafirms like Facebook and Google have 
5 
 
largely automated the types of decisions once made by managers and programmers at television 
networks, or editors at newspapers. Automated recommendations are often helpful, aiding 
audiences as they seek to sort out the blooming, buzzing confusion of topics online. But they are 
also destabilising traditional media institutions and circuits of knowledge.  
 
For example, the US election featured deeply disturbing stories about manipulation of social 
media for political ends. Unreliable sources proliferated, particularly among right-wing echo 
chambers. In December 2016, a Facebook-fuelled fake news story about Hillary Clinton 
prompted a man to arrive in a pizza parlour in Washington D.C. with a gun (Abrams 2016). The 
fake story reportedly originated in a white supremacist’s tweet. Politically motivated, profit-
seeking and simply reckless purveyors of untruths all prospered.  A Macedonian teen churned 
out stories with no basis, tarring Hillary Clinton with an endless series of lies, in order to score 
quick profits (Smith and Banic 2016). For profit-minded content generators, the only truth of 
Facebook is clicks and ad payments. Bence Kollanyi, Phil Howard, and Samuel Woolley 
estimated that tens of thousands of the tweets ‘written’ during the second US presidential debate 
were spewed by bots (Kollanyi et al 2016). These bots serve multiple functions – they can 
promote fake news, and when enough of them retweet one another, they can occupy the top slots 
in response to tweets from candidates. They can also flood hashtags, making it very difficult for 
ad hoc publics to crystallise around an issue. 
 
On Facebook, a metastatic array of fake content generators and hard-core partisan sites flooded 
news feeds with lies and propaganda. Facebook, as usual, disclaimed any responsibility for the 
spread of stories falsely claiming that the Pope had endorsed Donald Trump, or that Hillary 
Clinton is a Satanist (to give a mild pair of the lies that swarmed the platform) (Schaedel 2016; 
Evon 2016). But the Silicon Valley firm has several levels of responsibility.  
 
Basic design choices mean that stories shared on Facebook (as well as presented by Google’s 
AMP) have all looked very similar, for years (Chayka 2016). Thus a story from the fabricated 
‘Denver Guardian’ can appear as authoritative as a Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times 
investigation (Lubbers 2016). More directly, Facebook profits from fake news—the more a story 
is shared (whatever its merits), the more ad revenue it brings in (Molina 2016). Most 
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disturbingly, we now know that Facebook directly helped the Trump campaign target its voter 
suppression efforts at African-Americans (Winston 2016). 
 
Google has suffered from other racially tinged scandals (Noble 2018). Consider, for instance, 
recurrent problems with Google’s ‘autocompletes’ – when Google anticipates the rest of a search 
query from its first word or two. Google autocompletes have often embodied racist and sexist 
stereotypes (Cadwalladr 2016). Google image search has also generated biased results, absurdly 
and insultingly tagging some photos of black people as ‘gorillas’ (Guarino 2016; Barr 2015). 
If Google and Facebook had clear and publicly acknowledged ideological agendas, users could 
grasp them and ‘inoculate’ themselves accordingly, with scepticism toward self-serving views 
(Pasquale 2011). However, the platforms are better understood as tools rapidly manipulated to 
the advantage of search engine optimisers, well-organised extremists, and others at the fringes of 
political respectability or scientific validity. Thus a search for ‘Hillary’s Health’ in October 2016 
would have led to multiple misleading videos and articles groundlessly proclaiming that the US 
Democratic presidential candidate had Parkinson’s disease. Google search results reportedly 
helped shape the racism of Dylann Roof, who murdered nine people in a historically black South 
Carolina church in the US in 2015. Roof said that when he Googled ‘black on white crime, the 
first website I came to was the Council of Conservative Citizens,’ which is a white supremacist 
organisation. ‘I have never been the same since that day,’ he said (Hersher 2017). So too are 
sources of support for climate denialists, misogynists, ethnonationalists, and terrorists easily 
developed and cultivated in what has become an automated public sphere. 
 
These terrifying acts of violence and hate are likely to continue if action is not taken. Nor is 
democracy safe in a carelessly automated public sphere. Without a transparent curation process, 
the public has a hard time judging the legitimacy of online sources. Twitter, Facebook, and 
Google have permitted unreliable, manipulated sources to gain extraordinary prominence in the 
wake of mass shootings and other crises. Top executives at each firm have eschewed easily 
administered remedies (such as banning or downranking obviously unreliable sites and message 
boards). In response, a growing movement of academics, journalists and technologists is calling 
for more algorithmic accountability from Silicon Valley giants (Pasquale 2015a). As algorithms 
take on more importance in all walks of life, they are increasingly a concern of lawmakers. And 
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there are many steps both Silicon Valley companies and legislators should take to move toward 
more transparency and accountability. 
 
 
Toward a Robust Regime of Intermediary Responsibility 
 
Activist and academic responses to these imbroglios have been multifaceted. Some 
communication scholars have rightly criticised Facebook for its apparent indifference to the 
problem of fake or misleading viral content (Tufekci 2016). Others have focused their ire on the 
mainstream media, claiming that it was the recklessness or lack of professional responsibility at 
right-wing news sources (and established media institutions like CNN and the New York Times) 
which accelerated the rise of candidates like Trump (Kreiss 2016; Robinson 2016).  
 
In truth, there is no contradiction between a critique of the new media and deep disappointment 
in old media. The pathologies of each are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, any enduring solution 
to the problem will require cooperation between journalists and coders. Facebook can no longer 
credibly describe itself as merely a platform for others’ content, especially when it is profiting 
from micro-targeted ads (Pasquale 2016a). It has to take editorial responsibility. So, too, should 
megaplatforms like Google take on some basic responsibilities for the content they distribute. 
This section describes several specific initiatives that would help counter the discrimination, 
bias, and propaganda now too often polluting (and even overwhelming) online spaces. 
 
 
Label, monitor and explain hate-driven search results 
 
In 2004, anti-Semites boosted a Holocaust-denial site called ‘Jewwatch’ into the top 10 results 
for the query ‘Jew’ (Pasquale 2006). Ironically, some of those horrified by the site may have 
helped by linking to it in order to criticise it. The more a site is linked to, the more prominence 
Google’s algorithm gives it in search results. The Anti-Defamation League and other civil rights 
organisations complained to Google about its technology’s gift of prominence to entities 
eminently unworthy of such attention. 
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Google responded to complaints by adding a headline at the top of the page entitled ‘An 
explanation of our search results.’ A web page linked to the headline explained why the 
offensive site appeared so high in the relevant rankings, thereby distancing Google from the 
results. The label, however, no longer appears. In Europe and many other countries, lawmakers 
should consider requiring such labelling in the case of obvious hate speech. To avoid 
mainstreaming extremism, labels may link to accounts of the history and purpose of groups with 
innocuous names like ‘Council of Conservative Citizens’ (Pasquale 2016a; Pasquale 2008a). 
 
Are there free expression concerns here? Not really. Better labelling practices for food and drugs 
have escaped First Amendment scrutiny in the U.S., and why should information itself be 
different? As law professor Mark Patterson has demonstrated, many of our most important sites 
of commerce are markets for information: search engines are not offering products and services 
themselves but information about products and services, which may well be decisive in 
determining which firms and groups fail and which succeed (Patterson 2017). If they go 
unregulated, easily manipulated by whoever can afford the best search engine optimisation, 
people may be left at the mercy of unreliable and biased sources. 
 
 
Audit logs of the data fed into algorithmic systems 
 
We should expect any company aspiring to order vast amounts of information to try to keep its 
methods secret, if only to reduce controversy and foil copycat competitors.  However wise this 
secrecy may be as a business strategy, it devastates our ability to truly understand the social 
world Silicon Valley is creating.  Moreover, like a modern-day Ring of Gyges, opacity creates 
ample opportunities to hide anti-competitive, discriminatory, or simply careless conduct behind a 
veil of technical inscrutability.5 
 
A recurring pattern has developed: some entity complains about a major internet company’s 
practices, the company claims that its critics don’t understand how its algorithms sort and rank 
content, and befuddled onlookers are left to sift through rival stories in the press.  Massive search 
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operations are so complex, and so protected by real and legal secrecy, that it is almost always 
impossible for those outside a search engine or social network firm to identify all the signals that 
are driving a given set of results.  Silicon Valley journalists tend to give their advertisers the 
benefit of the doubt; national media outlets find the mysteries of online content ordering 
perfectly fit into their own templates of balanced reporting.  No one knows exactly what’s going 
on when a dispute arises, so rival accounts balance into an ‘objective’ equipoise. 
 
Regulators need to be able to understand how some racist or anti-Semitic groups and individuals 
are manipulating search and social media feeds (Pasquale 2010b). We should require immutable 
audit logs of the data fed into algorithmic systems. Machine-learning, predictive analytics or 
algorithms may be too complex for a person to understand, but the data records are not. They can 
be subject to algorithmic audits. 
 
A relatively simple set of reforms could vastly increase the ability of entities outside Google and 
Facebook to determine whether and how the firms’ results and news feeds are being 
manipulated. There is rarely adequate profit motive for firms themselves to do this — but 
motivated non-governmental organisations can help them be better guardians of the public 
sphere. 
 
 
Ban certain content 
 
In cases where computational reasoning behind search results really is too complex to be 
understood in conventional narratives or equations intelligible to humans, there is another 
regulatory approach available: to limit the types of information that can be provided. 
 
Though such an approach would raise constitutional objections in the U.S., nations like France 
and Germany have outright banned certain Nazi sites and memorabilia. Policymakers should also 
closely study laws regarding ‘incitement to genocide’ to develop guidelines for censoring hate 
speech with a clear and present danger of causing systematic slaughter or violence against 
vulnerable groups. It is a small price to pay for a public sphere less warped by hatred. And unless 
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something like it is done, expect social media driven panics about minorities to have even more 
devastating impact.  
 
To be sure, this approach would almost certainly draw immediate legal action in the United 
States, where a form of free expression fundamentalism has protected even the most 
reprehensible speech (Peters 2005). Cyberlibertarians tend to support further expanding First 
Amendment protections for algorithmic orderings of information. Relatedly, the same scholars 
and judges eager to protect the ‘speech’ of computers also promote the idea that massive 
corporations’ ‘expression’ is deserving of exceptional protection from the very state so often 
suborned or co-opted by those same corporations. The science fictional appeal of Asimov-ian 
ideals of ‘speaking robots’ has fed into a romanticisation of corporate speech. The logical 
endpoint is a continual ‘battle for mindshare’ by various robot armies, with the likely winner 
being the firms with the funds to hire the top programmers and the network effect dynamics to 
gather the most data for the optimal crafting of messages for microtargeted populations. It goes 
without saying that this type of decomposition of the public sphere does not represent a triumph 
of classic values of free expression (autonomy and democratic self-rule); indeed, it portends their 
evaporation into the manufactured consent of a phantom public.  
 
 
Permit limited outside annotations to defamatory posts and hire more humans to judge 
complaints 
 
Limited annotations – ‘rights of reply’ – could be permitted in certain instances of defamation of 
individuals or groups, or unfair or unbalanced depictions of them (Pasquale 2008a). Google 
continues to maintain that it doesn’t want human judgment blurring the autonomy of its 
algorithms. But even spelling suggestions depend on human judgment, and in fact, Google 
developed that feature not only by means of algorithms but also through a painstaking, iterative 
interplay between computer science experts and human beta testers who report on their 
satisfaction with various results configurations. As Sarah Roberts, Lily Irani, and Paško Bilić 
have shown, supposedly digitised companies are constantly reliant on manual interventions by 
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human beings (Bilić 2016; Irani 2013; Roberts 2016a; 2016b). Requiring a few more is not a 
major burden for these firms.  
 
This step is important because we now know (if we ever doubted) that the hoary ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ metaphor is misleading. The best ideas are not necessarily the most highly valued; the 
most sensational or gratifying propaganda can beat out careful reporting. Highly motivated, well-
resourced groups can easily manipulate newsfeeds or search engine result pages (SERPs). ‘Dark 
ads’ and sophisticated personalisation algorithms enable constant experimentation on unwitting 
human research subjects, so A/B testing (particularly when used to measure divergent responses 
among thousands of users) can reveal exactly what manipulation works best. Without 
conscientious and professional curation of such algorithmic orderings of information, the public 
sphere’s automation is susceptible to distortion by the most well-resourced entities.6 
 
 
Limit the predation possible by online intermediaries 
 
Personalisation is leading advertisers to abandon traditional, and even not-so-traditional, 
publishers in favour of the huge Internet platforms. No other rival can approach either the 
granularity or the comprehensiveness of their data. The result is a revolution-in-process about 
who can afford to keep publishing, and concomitant alarm about the concentration of media 
clout into fewer and fewer hands. One platform owner, Jeff Bezos, accumulated wealth 
equivalent to one hundred times the total value of the United States' second most important 
newspaper, The Washington Post. He bought the Post, with concomitant chilling effects on the 
paper’s ability to criticise his own business empire-building, or similar strategies by platform 
capitalists. Given the leverage potential of their own ever-higher expected earnings, large 
platforms may soon be able to move to buy more content producers themselves, as cable 
networks and internet service providers (ISPs) have done – or perhaps buy cable networks and 
ISPs. Further vertical integration would be a major threat to the autonomy of journalism. 
 
Given all the negative externalities generated by online intermediaries, policymakers should limit 
the profits such intermediaries make relative to revenues of the content owners whose work they 
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depend on. In the health care context in the US, private insurers can only keep a certain 
percentage of premiums (usually 15 to 20%) – the rest must go to health care providers, like 
hospitals, doctors, and pharmaceutical firms. Such a rule keeps the intermediary from taking too 
much of the spending in a sector – a clear and present danger in monopolistic internet contexts, 
as well. Governments could limit the amount of profits that search engines and social networks 
make as intermediaries, requiring them to pay some share of their revenues to content generators 
like newspapers and media firms (Lanier 2013; Lehdonvirta 2017). Alternatively, policymakers 
could simply force large platforms to pay a fair share of the tax they now avoid by shuttling 
income to tax havens (see Schneider in this volume), and use some of that revenue for public 
broadcasting alternatives.  
 
 
Obscure content that is damaging and not of public interest 
 
When it comes to search queries on an individual person’s name, many countries have 
aggressively forced Google to be more careful in how it assembles data dossiers presented as 
search engine result pages. Thanks to the Court of Justice of the European Union, Europeans can 
now request the removal of certain search results revealing information that is ‘inadequate, 
irrelevant, no longer relevant or excessive,’ unless there is a greater public interest in being able 
to find the information via a search on the name of the data subject (Pasquale 2016b). 
 
Such removals are a middle ground between information anarchy and censorship. They neither 
disappear information from the internet (it can be found at the original source, and in searches on 
terms other than the complaining party’s name), nor allow it to dominate the impression of the 
aggrieved individual. They are a kind of obscurity that lets ordinary individuals avoid having a 
single incident indefinitely dominate search results on his or her name. For example, a woman 
whose husband was murdered 20 years ago successfully forced Google to take news of the 
murder off search results on her name. This type of public responsibility is a first step toward 
making search results and social network newsfeeds reflect public values and privacy rights. 
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Concerns and Concessions 
 
There will be fierce opposition to virtually all of the proposals I have listed above. Some will 
arise merely out of commercial motivations: policing hate speech and fake news is more 
expensive than letting it flourish. Platforms would rather just pile up advertising revenue. As Jodi 
Dean has demonstrated, outrageous content stokes at least as much engagement online as it has 
in the traditional media (Dean 2010). Indeed, the problem is easily intensified online, as 
personalisation allows platforms to deliver material precisely targeted to maximise clicks, likes, 
and shares (Citron 2014). Slowing down that accelerated engagement costs a platform potential 
advertising, and all-important data about its users (Srnicek 2017). It also impedes the platform’s 
ability to shape its users into the kind of people who uncritically act in behaviouristically 
manipulable ways (Schüll 2012). Unless platforms can demonstrate that the intermediary 
responsibilities discussed above would compromise their ability to run the platform at a 
reasonable rate of return, such cost-based objections should be dismissed. Neither Mark 
Zuckerberg nor Facebook shareholders have any legitimate expectation of permanent, massive 
returns on their investment. Indeed, impeding their ability to accumulate the surplus they have 
used to buy rival and adjacent firms may well encourage innovation (Stucke and Grunes 2017). 
 
Many apologists for big tech firms claim that this type of responsibility is impossible (or unwise) 
for a firm like Facebook to take on (Turton 2016; Lessin 2016). They argue that the volume of 
shared content is simply too high to be managed by any individual, or team of individuals. But 
this argument ignores the reality of continual algorithmic and manual manipulation of search 
results at Google. As technology writer Timothy Lee explains: 
 
During the 2000s, people got better and better at gaming Google’s search algorithm. 
Some were running quasi-media companies whose writers churned out dozens of 
extremely short, poorly researched articles based on popular search terms. (…) In a 
January 2011 blog post, Google search quality czar Matt Cutts acknowledged that Google 
had a big problem with these ‘content farms.’  (…) Later that year, Google brought down 
the hammer, releasing changes to its search algorithm that caused traffic at major content 
farms to plummet. (…) [This] represented Google making a deliberate value judgment 
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that some kinds of content were worse than other kinds. Early versions of Google took a 
naively data-driven approach, assuming that a link from one site to another was a sign of 
quality. [In later, more sophisticated iterations,] Google include[d] human reviewers in 
the mix because algorithms inevitably make mistakes and manual human review is 
needed to keep the algorithms on the right track. Previously reviewed pages can be fed 
back into Google’s software, allowing the algorithms to learn from human judgment and 
get better over time. So Facebook doesn’t have to choose between fighting fake news 
with algorithms or human editors. An effective fight against fake news is going to require 
heavy use of both approaches. (Lee 2016) 
 
There are powerful lessons in this passage. First, be wary of platforms’ convenient self-
reification. Facebook may aspire to be merely a technology company. Those aspirations may 
express themselves as a petulant insistence that unsupervised, rather than supervised, machine 
learning is the ideal way to solve problems on the platform. But that ‘identity’ is a constructed 
and convenient one, directly at odds with tech firms’ repeated invocation of free expression 
protections to shield their actions from governmental scrutiny (Pasquale 2016c). 
 
Beyond economic and technical objections, there is a third, deeper objection to intermediary 
responsibility, focusing on the regulatory apparatus necessary to make it meaningful and robust. 
Authoritarian regimes have tried to stifle political dissent by regulating Facebook and Google. 
For example, the Thai, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish governments have aggressively policed 
criticism of national leaders, and have intimidated dissidents. Corrupt governments may be 
susceptible to excessive influence from well-organised lobbies. Fossil fuel lobbyists may 
influence regulators to force intermediaries to monitor and censor environmental activists 
committed to resistance against pipeline projects (Citron and Pasquale 2011: 1445; ACLU 2017). 
Overly onerous annotation requirements, or rights to be forgotten, may become a pretext for 
driving a popular platform out of a country. Governments may abuse taxation powers, too, in 
retaliation against a platform that enables stinging or politically effective criticism of them. Or 
platforms may successfully lobby to have their own personnel and allies appointed to the 
agencies and commissions set to regulate them. A search or robotics or social network 
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commission, for example, might start out with a robust agenda, but over years or decades, may 
gradually find itself taken over by appointees closely aligned with dominant industry players.7  
 
Still, there is little reason to assume that the actions of the worst governments are likely in other, 
more developed and democratic public spheres. Indeed, intervention in the public sphere while a 
polity is still well-ordered may be the only way to keep it well-ordered. Some of these concerns 
are variations on the classic problem of regulatory capture: the very institutions meant to regulate 
an industry may be taken over by that industry. Fortunately, the problem has now been so 
carefully studied that many prophylactic measures could be put in place to avoid it (Carpenter 
and Moss 2014). Revolving door rules could prevent officials and bureaucrats from working for 
the industry they are regulating for five or ten years after they depart their agency. Higher pay for 
regulators, coupled with long-term or even lifetime bars on revolving door employment, would 
also help assure more independence. So, too, would self-funding mechanisms limit certain forms 
of political interference (Kruly, 2013). While serious, the problem of regulatory capture is not 
insurmountable.  
 
More serious is a larger problem of circularity, well-identified by Charles Lindblom: the ability 
of powerful economic entities, to take over political institutions, and use that political power to 
enhance their economic power, which gives them resources necessary to further entrench 
political power (Lindblom 1977: 201-213). The rise of oligarchical power in nations around the 
world suggests how deep the problem of circularity can be (Winters 2011). The tendency of 
oligarchs to enact programs that simultaneously harm the material conditions of their electoral 
base, while cultivating and consolidating its sense of political identity organised around common 
grievance, should also serve as a spur to reconsidering the foundations of the critiques that 
motivated the program of reform developed above. In other words: in some societies, reform 
aimed at the public sphere is doomed to be counterproductive or worse, since governing 
institutions are hopelessly corrupt. This is the likely end-stage of what Jack Balkin has described 
as constitutional rot: the gradual corrosion of democratic institutions. Such a process may be 
incipient in many self-styled democracies today (Balkin 2017).  
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Well-intended reformers may also end up exacerbating the very dynamics they propose to 
ameliorate. For example, consider the classic problem of the filter bubble (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 
2007), and its opponents’ efforts to expose more persons to views they disagree with. 
Personalisation often enables internet users to ignore points of view they disagree with, so the 
filter bubble model states, and therefore increases polarisation. Common solutions to the filter 
bubble dynamic presume, first, that ‘all sides’ or ‘both sides’ can be exposed to some critical 
mass of opposing or diverse viewpoints via, say, must-carry rules, or some privately 
implemented version of them (Pasquale 2016a: 499-500). To make modelling of that reform 
tractable, assume for now a binary society, divided between left and right voters. The great 
problem for advocates of ‘filter bubble’ reforms is that they cannot adequately model whether 
exposure of one side’s adherents to the other side’s version of facts, priorities, ideology, or 
values, will lead to understanding or revulsion, reconsideration or recalcitrance. 
 
To be sure, effects studies in media have been contested for decades. It may be impossible for 
today’s digital deliberative democrats to demonstrate the empirical likelihood of open-
mindedness among voters. But they should be open to understanding the danger of plausible 
models of asymmetrical openness to opposing views. A society may have a ‘hard left’ and a ‘soft 
right,’ such that those on the right are quite willing to assess and even adopt some left proposals, 
while the vast majority of the left is unalterably opposed to accepting any right ideas. In such a 
scenario, all an assault on the filter bubble will likely do, is chip away at conservative self-
identification among the ‘soft right,’ and succour the hard left. A ‘spiral of silence’ may even 
develop (Noelle-Neuman 1977). Perhaps intuiting that danger to its coherence and ability to 
project power, today’s right in the United States may be inoculating itself against such 
ideological slippage. Very often, those in the centre right will defend or applaud those to their 
right, but the comity rarely goes the other way (Nagle 2017). 
 
In a situation of asymmetrical persuadability, filter bubble inspired reforms will tend only to 
consolidate the power of the social group or political party most steadfastly committed to 
maintaining its own position. We can, of course, imagine 12 Angry Men-type scenarios where a 
small remnant of deeply moral hold-outs uses its reform-granted exposure to others to gradually 
convince the rest of society of the wisdom of its position. However, just as likely is a splitting of 
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society into the more contemplative and the more active, alas the famed quote on the ‘reality-
based community’ from a member of the George W. Bush administration.8  
 
This elementary challenge to filter-bubble driven reform suggests a larger problem with  
deliberativist political theory (Pasquale 2008c). How can democracy operate when large swathes 
of the population subscribe to diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of politics? 
Consider the deliberativist approach as one end of a spectrum of theories of politics, with a 
Schmittian, decisionist approach on the opposite end. Deliberativists see politics as 
fundamentally a realm of reasoning, culminating in some form of agreement (or at least 
improved understanding) after debate (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004). Jürgen Habermas detailed the ‘ideal speech situation’ as the regulative ideal of 
such political deliberation, where everyone would either be able to voice their own views, and 
learn from others, or at least count on their political representatives in a legislative body 
engaging in a similar process (Habermas 1991). 
 
Habermas’s conception of parliamentary democracy was part of a long scholarly campaign to lay 
to rest the type of post-rational, emotivist politics associated with Carl Schmitt (Müller-Doohm 
2017). But Schmitt’s critical ideas are finding more traction today, both in diagnoses of political 
polarisation, and in the actual attitudes and actions of many voters and politicians. For those 
committed to a Schmittian perspective, there are friends and enemies in politics, and almost no 
new information can dissuade them from their attachment to their party or leader. Donald J. 
Trump memorably bragged that he could ‘shoot someone on Fifth Avenue,’ and his voters would 
still support him. That is a Schmittian devotion par excellence, increasingly reflected in polling 
data (Struyk 2017). More strategically, a political party may change voting rules to entrench its 
power, creating a self-reinforcing dynamic: the more the rules change in its favour, the more 
opportunities it has to entrench majorities and super-majorities that enable further rule changes 
(Daley 2015; Berman 2016). In such circumstances, some or all of the reforms mentioned above 
could backfire, simply adding to the power of a dominant party in a disordered polity, rather than 
preserving and promoting the type of pluralism that is a hallmark of a well-ordered democracy.  
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Conclusion: A Return to Professionalism 
 
Given the potential pitfalls of regulating the automated public sphere, implementation of the 
reform ideas in Part II above should be undertaken with care in well-ordered polities, and may be 
impossible or counterproductive in disordered polities. But regardless of those difficult 
distinctions, those in media can do much to respond to the automated public sphere’s infirmities. 
Journalists should be more assertive about their own professional prerogatives and identity. In 
the aftermath of the fake news scandals, Tim O’Reilly asserted that decisions about the 
organisation of newsfeeds and presentation of information in them were inherently algorithmic 
functions, to be supervised by the engineers at Facebook (O’Reilly 2016). Certainly the alpha 
geeks whom O’Reilly describes as his subject share that view: the human editors of trending 
topics at Facebook were low status, contract workers, who were unceremoniously dumped when 
a thinly sourced news story asserted that conservative content was being suppressed (Ohlheiser 
2016; CBS News 2016). Shortly thereafter, Facebook was swamped by the fake news which now 
is the topic of so much controversy. The real lesson here is that human editors at Facebook 
should be given more authority. Their deliberations should also be open to some forms of 
scrutiny and accountability; for example, an ombudsperson or public editor with staff should 
interface between editors and members of the public aggrieved by their decisions.  
 
Some communication scholars have resisted the idea of professionalisation of online content 
creation, curation, and delivery, in the name of democratising the power of the press to anyone 
with a computer and an Internet connection. While a beautiful ideal in theory, in practice, a 
failure among the de facto sovereigns of the Internet to distinguish between stories on the real 
Guardian and the dubious Denver Guardian is not simply a neutral decision to level the 
informational playing field. Rather, it predictably accelerates propaganda tactics honed by 
millions of dollars of investment in both data brokerages and shadowy quasi-state actors now 
investigated by the CIA as sources of bias, disinformation, and illegal influence in the election 
(Revesz 2016; Feldman 2016). Freedom for the pike is death for the minnows. A true citizen 
journalism depends on some basic forms of intermediary responsibility. 
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In the 1980s, the chair of the US Federal Communications Commission, Mark Fowler, dismissed 
the bulk of regulation of broadcasters as irrelevant, since he viewed the television as nothing 
more than ‘a toaster with pictures’ (Boyer 1987). In the 2010s, for better or worse, vast 
conglomerates like Facebook and Google effectively take on the role of global communication 
regulators. Mark Zuckerberg’s repeated insistence that Facebook is nothing more than a 
technology company is a sad reprise of Fowler’s laissez-faire ideology. It is also deeply 
hypocritical, for the firm imposes all manner of rules and regulations on both users and 
advertisers when such rules generate profits (Pasquale 2015b). 
 
 
The public sphere cannot be automated like an assembly line churning out toasters. As Will 
Oremus has explained, there are aspects of the journalistic endeavour that are inherently human; 
so, too, are editorial functions necessarily reflective of human values (Oremus 2014). Expect 
deep and persistent conflict over the proper balance between commercial interests and the public 
interest in assigning prominence to different sources and stories. These are matters of utmost 
importance to the future of democracy. They can no longer be swept under the rug by plutocrats 
more interested in stock returns and artificial intelligence advances than the basic democratic 
institutions and civil society that underpin each. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Note, too, that the filter bubble problem is not altogether plausibly one of left voters needing to be exposed to right 
voters’ worldview, and vice versa (for who knows how far along the spectrum of ideology once should search for 
alternative views, or how rotten centrist consensus is). Rather, it is one of a lack of autonomy and understanding of 
how one’s media environment is shaped. 
2 As Deleuzian social theory teaches, the subjects of Big Data analysis ‘are becoming less individuals than 
“dividuals:” entities ready to be divided into any number of pieces, with specific factors separated, scrutinized, and 
surveilled. What the person does becomes less important than the consequences calculated in response to emanated 
data streams’ (Sadowski and Pasquale, 2015).  
3 Media pluralism is necessary for maintaining the integrity of the democratic process; reducing the impact of the 
misrepresentation and suppression of information; promoting access to diverse information and opinions; and 
protecting freedom of expression (Smith and Tambini, 2012; Smith, Tamibini, and Morisi, 2012). 
4 While the platforms will often insist that they are the true victims of propagandists, they somehow manage to seek 
out and stop a great deal of the web spam and manipulation that threatens their advertising business models. 
5 The Ring of Gyges is a myth from Plato, which describes a ring which renders its wearer invisible. It is often 
framed as the prompt for moral reflection: would individuals act morally if no one knew what they were doing? 
6 The European Union’s commitments to rights to be forgotten, and rights of erasure, show that the algorithmic 
ordering of information can be a socially inflected process, with fairer modes of participation for citizens and civil 
society (Wagner 2016a; Wagner 2016b; Pasquale 2016b). To be sure, the right to be forgotten should not be a matter 
almost entirely decided by private firms with only cursory or very rare review by governmental authorities. 
Developing better-resourced management of difficult issues in data provision and management, should be a key 
priority for authorities in this field. But the initial step toward algorithmic accountability is laudable. 
7 Bracha and Pasquale (2008) included the first discussion in legal literature of a regulatory body targeted at search 
engines. 
8 The journalist Ron Suskind authored an article that quoted a senior George W. Bush administration official as 
saying ‘that guys like me were “in what we call the reality-based community,” which he defined as people who 
“believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.” (...) “That's not the way the world 
really works anymore,” he continued. “We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And 
while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you 
can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors (…) and you, all of you, will be left to just 
study what we do.”’ Suskind (2004). 
